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What do we mean when we talk about ‘hybrids’ and 






The public administration literature uses the concept of hybridity to describe 
situations where policy designs involve the interaction of government, business, civil 
society, and not-for-profits.  Yet the concept lacks a theoretical context and poses the 
empirical problem of distinguishing between hybrid and non-hybrid forms.  This 
paradox – a concept that is widely used but seems to play no useful function in theory 
building or advice to policy-makers – is explored through a discussion of five 
theories.  Transaction cost economics, management theory, archetype theory, and 
institutional theory begin to resolve the theoretical and empirical problems, but 
significant difficulties remain.  Cultural theory offers a productive solution to the 
paradox by understanding hybridity as a process through which new possibilities for 





HYBRIDITY – CHALLENGES FOR THE FIELD 
 
Hybridity is an often used but little discussed term in the public administration 
literature.  It symbolises how policy questions involve the interpenetration of different 
spheres of activity – government, business, civil society, not-for-profits – and how 
these interconnections are structured through parastatal organizations such as public-
private partnerships, collaborative management, and governance or policy networks.  
Yet the concept has little theoretical or empirical purchase beyond this generic notion, 
and only a few scholars have attempted to fill this gap (e.g. Brandsen, van de Donk 
and Putters 2005; Joldersma and Winter 2002; Koppell 2003; Skelcher 2005; Smith 
2010).  Thus hybridity presents a paradox:  it is a term in good currency, but seems 
unable to fulfil accepted functions of scholarship and policy advice.  Important 
questions follow: does hybridity as a concept has a useful place in the lexicon of 
public administration?  Is it just a generic, symbolic term or can it help scholars 
understand and explain the nature of contemporary public governance and provide a 
basis for policy advice?  For the paradox is to be resolved in a way that takes the field 
forward, the concept must be firmly connected to theoretical perspectives, be able to 
guide empirical research, and be of use to those involved in improving the design and 
delivery of public programmes.  This paper advances the debate by critically 
analyzing the main theories of hybridity in fields cognate to public administration, 
and then showing how insights from cultural theory – to date little used in our 
discipline – opens up a fruitful new line of investigation.   
 
The concept of hybridity commonly accepted in public administration has a strong 
association with forms of organization, management and governance.  One of the 
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more frequently cited sources, Borys and Jeminson, writing from a business 
management perspective, argue that hybrids are “organizational arrangements that use 
resources and/or governance structures from more than one existing organization” 
(Borys and Jemison 1989, 235).  They emphasise the coming together of two or more 
sovereign organizations to pursue common interests that would be more difficult to 
achieve because of the limitations of unitary organizations, examples being mergers, 
acquisitions, joint ventures, license agreements, and partnering.  Borys and Jemison’s 
definition is broadly reflective of usage in public administration.  Our field views the 
hybrid organization as an instrument of public policy design based on the expectation 
that such corporate forms will improve performance relative to the traditional model 
of politically-controlled departments and ministries (Skelcher 2008).  As a result, 
there has been widespread adoption of contractually-based relationships (as in public-
private partnerships created around infrastructure developments), strategic partnering 
through which organizations to some extent merge resources and identity, and joint 
ventures or multi-organizational partnerships constituted as new corporate entities.  
So, hybrids are “expected to function like businesses: to be efficient, customer driven, 
and client oriented.  Yet, they perform tasks that are inherently public” (Kickert 2001, 
136). 
 
Yet if we take Borys and Jemison’s definition into the mainstream structures of public 
administration, things are not quite so clear.  What, for example, are we to make of 
the archetypal government department headed by an elected official, which combines 
bureaucratic and political templates?  Or the school as a professionally structured 
organization that also has a consumerist component through the formal incorporation 
of students’ and parents’ views via school councils and parent associations?  This 
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introduces the question of the limits to hybridity in public administration – or, indeed, 
whether there are any limits.  And as Minkoff (2002) points out, the way in which the 
concept of hybrid is typically used in public administration, as combining features 
from distinct organizational forms, is different to the usage in the not-for-profit 
literature, where it refers to an organizational subsidiary operating on a different 
governance or business model to the parent.  Changes in the relationship between not-
for-profits and government, especially in response to turbulence arising from the 
global financial crisis and government austerity measures, have led Smith (2010) to 
adopt a definition of hybridity that comes close to Brandsen, van de Donk and 
Putters’s (2005) view that it is an inevitable and permanent characteristic of the not-
for-profit sector.  If this is the case, then the inability to distinguish between ‘hybrid’ 
and ‘not hybrid’ poses a major challenge for the value of the concept.   
 
The public administration community has paid little attention to the scientific analysis 
of the concept of hybridity, or to explanatory or normative theory building in which 
this concept has a central role.  This article moves the debate on by injecting explicitly 
theoretical considerations, complementing the strategy adopted in a recent discussion 
of hybridity in the accounting field (Miller, Kurunmäki and O’Leary 2008).  It looks 
beyond the public administration literature to consider other ways in which hybridity 
has been conceptualised in economic, managerial, archetype, and institutional theory, 
and draws out the implications for public administration scholars.  The paper then 
examines cultural theory, and argues that this provides a valuable way forward for 
scholarship and policy advice by analysing and explaining the processes of 
argumentation and negotiation that take place around policy designs in specific social 





HYBRIDITY BETWEEN MARKET AND HIERARCHY 
 
Our discussion starts with the theory of transaction cost economics (TCE) since – like 
much public administration literature – this positions hybridity in relation to market 
and hierarchy.  TCE explains the choice of governance structure as a function of an 
actor’s intention to minimise the incidence of transaction costs in relation to a given 
type of exchange.  Williamson (1996) discusses three governance structures – market, 
hierarchy and hybrid, the latter being an intermediate mode of governance between 
the polar opposites of market and hierarchy.  Hybrids trade off some of the price 
incentives and actor autonomy found in market governance for a degree of the 
administrative control and coordination provided by hierarchy.  If hybrids occupy this 
uncomfortable middle ground between market and hierarchy, what are their features?   
 
Ménard’s discussion of this question starts with the observation that the vocabulary 
has not stabilised.  He refers to hybrid forms as a “collection of weirdos”: “From 
loose clusters of firms to quasi-integrated partners, the set of arrangements that rely 
neither on markets nor hierarchies for organising transactions is broad and potentially 
confusing” (Ménard 2004, 3).  This breadth is reflected in the various hybrid forms he 
identifies in the literature: subcontracting, networks of firms, franchising, collective 
trademarks, partnership, cooperatives, and alliances.  So while market and hierarchy 
are the limiting cases, hybridity does not form a discrete third category.  Instead, 
hybridity manifests itself at various points on a continuum between market and 
hierarchy.  Consequently we can separate the concepts at a theoretical level, but an 
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empirical problem remains – namely, how can we delimit where hybridity ends and 
market or hierarchy starts?  This is a problem for the empirical analysis of hybridity in 
contemporary forms of public organization.  It leads to the question of whether 
hybridity is the norm, while market and hierarchy are the exception, an issue 
considered in more detail below. 
 
Notwithstanding the variety of empirical types, Ménard identifies three regularities 
common to hybrid forms of governance.  First, resources are pooled between the 
participating actors.  This occurs because the fragmentation in markets reduces the 
capacity to bundle resources in a way that facilitates the necessary collective 
investment desired by the parties, while hierarchy reduces the adaptability and 
flexibility offered by retaining decentralised decision-making.  Resource pooling 
creates the possibility of opportunistic behaviour by one of the parties, and thus 
appropriate mechanisms need to be created to protect actors’ collective and individual 
interests.  This leads to the second feature of hybridity, which is contracting.  Ménard 
argues that contracts help to create a reciprocal relationship between legally 
independent parties.  But because contracts are incomplete, the core feature of hybrids 
is the creation of forms of institutional arrangements that reduce the need for 
continual and costly negotiation and renegotiation over time.  The final feature of 
hybridity is competitive pressure.  In comparison to firms, the competitive pressures 
in hybrids operate in two ways.  First, the partners remain independent actors and thus 
have the capacity to make autonomous decisions.  Thus there is a potential for 
competition between partners.  Second, hybridity tend to develop in highly 
competitive markets where resource pooling is a preferred strategy for gaining 
advantage.  Consequently, any given hybrid will be competing against other hybrids, 
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possibly of a different form, and thus there is the risk that one or more parties may 
switch allegiance.  This means that hybrids as corporate entities have to design ways 
to establish areas where decisions must be taken jointly, and inappropriate 
autonomous behaviour constrained.  Ménard concludes: “Aspects of these regularities 
are present in markets and hierarchies.  But what distinguishes (and plagues) hybrid 
arrangements is that these regularities are rooted in a mix of competition and 
cooperation that subordinates the key role played by prices in markets and by 
command in hierarchies…..  Thus the workability of this mix depends on specific 
mechanisms capable of reconciling legal autonomy and interdependence” (2002, 9). 
 
It is precisely this issue that is explored in Koppell’s analysis of Fannie Mae, Fannie 
Mac and other part-public, part-private agencies operating at arm’s-length to 
government, each “created by … government … to address a specific public policy 
purpose [and]… owned in whole or in part by private individuals or corporations 
and/or generat[ing] revenue to cover its operating costs” (2003, 12).  Thus such 
hybrids deliver public policy, but have a corporate status that gives them greater 
autonomy than would be possible if they were constituted within a government 
bureaucracy.  And although they are creatures of government, they also lobby 
politicians and civil servants as if they were private companies.  In TCE terms 
therefore, these hybrid forms locate between the limiting cases of market and 
hierarchy.  Koppell argues that their quasi-governmental status provides a solution to 
the problem of credible commitment, by insulating them from short term political 
pressures and special interests.  However it is also clear that their quasi-market 
orientation facilitates programme delivery through the use of a variety of financial 




Overall, TCE takes us some way towards explaining hybridity as a solution to public 
policy problems where there is a likelihood both of market failure and government 
(that is, hierarchical) failure.  However, at a conceptual level, the multiple possible 
manifestations of hybridity sit uneasily against the unitary definitions of market and 
hierarchy.  If hybridity is everything except market and hierarchy, and these two 
concepts themselves are the limiting (and perhaps purely theoretical) points for a 
continuum of hybrid types, then the conclusion is that the majority of empirical case 
will de facto be hybrids.  This rather reduces the conceptual and empirical power of 
the term in terms of its usefulness in distinguishing governance forms other than in 
purely theoretical TCE analysis.  
 
 
HYBRIDITY AS PRAGMATIC ORGANIZATIONAL DESIGN 
 
A solution to the problem of how to define and explain hybrids in a way that is more 
specific than that offered by TCE comes from Mintzberg’s (1993) work on the design 
of organizations.  In broad terms, Mintzberg argues that there are five ideal-typical 
organizational designs:  
1. Simple structure – coordination is achieved through direct supervision by the 
strategic apex, resulting in a highly centralised organization with limited 
formalization or standardization 
2. Machine bureaucracy – here there is a high degree of specialization, 
formalization and standardization, with a strong emphasis on achieving 
predictability and controllability of organizational activity and outputs, 
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delivered through an information rich technostructure and delegated authority 
to line managers 
3. Professional bureaucracy – in this design the complexity of the tasks 
undertaken by the organization are such that it requires delegation to skilled 
front-line workers operating within a common procedural framework, the 
conformance to which may be subject to a degree of external regulation 
4. Divisionalised form – this organizational design is characterised by multi-
functional and semi-autonomous operating units whose performance is subject 
to supervision by a central headquarters function  
5. Adhocracy - in this form, there is a flat structure in which teams form and 
reform in order to solve problems that arise from a complex and dynamic task 
environment, and where coordination takes place through a process of mutual 
adjustment between actors.   
 
He argues that the organizational forms that can be identified empirically typically 
exhibit various combinations of these ideal types, thus constituting a class of 
structural hybrids.  These combinations arise from the relative attractiveness exerted 
by each of the ideal types.  For example, a strong pull by simple structure and 
adhocracy will produce an entrepreneurial adhocracy in which small self-organising 
teams are coordinated by an overall manager.  Such pushes and pulls are evident in 
the public administration field as ideas about the optimal organizational form come 
and go.   
 
This approach overcomes the problem TCE faces in defining hybridity as a distinct 
category at the empirical level.  However in moving from the view that the number 
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(N) of possible type of hybrid (h) is everything except the two limiting pure cases of 
market and hierarchy, the Mintzberg solution still leaves a large number since in this 
case Nh = 5! = 120.  What Mintzberg’s approach does not provide is a theoretical 
explanation for the resultant hybrids.  While TCE explains hybrid form as a function 
of actors’ desire to minimise transaction costs, the management approach set out 
above presents a hybrid as a result of the relative “pull” (as Mintzberg describes it) 
exerted by each of the five basic types.  This perspective lacks a theory of agency.  It 
is not clear how or why such a pull arises, what it is that exerts the pull, nor how this 
relates to actors either as originators, instruments, or recipients of the pull.  We need 




HYBRIDITY AS PATH BREAKING BEHAVIOUR 
 
A theoretical perspective on hybrid creation is offered by archetype theory within the 
field of organizational sociology.  Archetype theory posits that institutionally 
legitimated interpretive schemes, or set of beliefs and values, operate within 
organizational fields, and shape the orientation of actors towards particular 
conceptions of organizational design, practice and task.  An archetype is “a set of 
structures and systems that consistently embodies a single interpretive scheme” 
(Greenwood and Hinings 1993, 1055).  Greenwood and Hinings argue that these 
interpretive schemes arise through dialogue between actors in the field, such as 
professional associations, government, and major business organizations.  The 
interpretive schemes may be reinforced by normative accreditation frameworks (for 
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example, through professional recognition) in ways that promote coherence around 
the archetype, which in turn are incentivised by the economic benefits they produce 
(for example, a flow of customers or preferred supplier status).   
 
From the perspective of archetype theory, organizational redesign may occur as a 
result of changes in the environment affecting that organizational field, mediated by 
key field-level actors and intra-organizational processes.  For example, professional 
associations are identified as institutional entrepreneurs who may promote new 
practices.  However new designs will tend to remain in a “design track” or path such 
that they evolve within the broad parameters of the prevailing archetype.  
Exceptionally, there may be “design excursions” outside the track, including hybrid 
forms that emerge between archetypes, but these are regarded as unlikely to survive 
the normative and functional imperatives operating in the field.   
 
Despite the conservative and functionalist orientation of archetype theory (Kirkpatrick 
and Ackroyd 2003), there is more that can be done with this theory in terms of 
explaining hybrid creation.  The theory was developed from empirical research in UK 
local government in the 1970s and subsequently in the legal and accountancy 
professions.  The norms applying in these three organizational fields may be expected 
to accord with an institutional logic of proceduralism and regularity, because of the 
professional and public interest nature of their activities and the potential for harm as 
a result of poor decisions.  Under different conditions, the theory has less explanatory 
power.  Continuing with the example of UK local government, analysis of 
developments in the past decade and a half show considerable experimentation and 
change (Stewart 2003).  Some of this is within the design track, but much is beyond it 
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– in areas that archetype theory would see as random excursions and unstable hybrids.  
In particular, there has been widespread adoption of collaborative management or 
partnership processes.  These are novel forms of organizational design that 
significantly alter public policy relationships by bringing public managers, business 
representatives and citizens together in order to shape and oversee the delivery of 
public policy at the neighbourhood, city and sub-regional level, operating at arm’s 
length from elected officials.   
 
There are two ways of explaining the widespread emergence of hybridity, and thus 
refining archetype theory.  One explanation is that the development of this trans-
archetype form was functional for the professional groups involved.  Despite 
Kirkpatrick and Ackroyd’s view that the traditional values of public service 
professionals remained robust, and by implication would continue support for intra-
archetype change, there is evidence that the partnership hybrid was very appealing.  It 
extended the professional and managerial discretion available under new public 
management, reduced the level of political oversight of professional activity, and 
increased contact between professionals and citizen-consumers.   The second 
explanation is that at certain moments the legitimization of an interpretive scheme is 
more compelling than the pressure for coherence around an existing archetype.  The 
partnership discourse was expressed through a grand coalition of state, civil society 
and business actors.  In the face of such compelling voices, existing archetypes tracks 
for local government ended at the buffers and new hybrid tracks took over (Clarke 





HYBRIDITY AS INSTITUTIONAL ENTREPENEURIALISM 
 
Archetype theory, with its emphasis on the normally of path dependent behaviour, has 
a close association with historical institutionalism.  It struggles to reconcile this 
propensity to privilege the dominant force of sunk investment with its awareness of 
the possibilities of agency being exercised through path-breaking excursions 
producing a potential for hybridity.  In contrast, recent developments in sociological 
institutionalism provide a more fruitful way forward.  The work of Crouch (2005) is 
particularly important.  He argues that hybrid governance is the norm rather than the 
exception in advanced capitalist economies, echoing the conclusions reached in the 
earlier discussion of TCE.  Having examined different types of state (e.g. Rechtstaat, 
unitary), economic institution (e.g. market, corporate hierarchy), and societal 
organization (e.g. association, community), he concludes that “hardly any of them is 
likely to be fully autonomous….  In fact, in anything beyond a very primitive system, 
what is called a free market economy is always really a hybrid between the pure 
market and the procedural state” (2005, 120). Crouch warns of the danger, noted 
earlier, of confusing ideal types with empirically observable institutions, and thus 
cautions against regarding variations from the ideal type as exceptional deviations: “It 
is important to give these forms of variation an important role in analysis, in order to 
avoid a determinism that assert that actors within particular forms of governance 
simply cannot engage in certain forms of behaviour…. When practice is seen to 
deviate from a well-established pattern in a systematic way, there must be an 
explanation.  Possibly the theory was always wrong to have asserted the previous 
regularity, and possibly had ignored certain characteristics not given by the logic of 
the ideal type; these types are after all only constructed, they have no necessary place 
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in reality” (2005, 123).  The argument, then, is that at an empirical level, hybrid 
entities are the norm and ideal types the exception.  This may seem a fairly obvious 
conclusion, but it does not accord with the way in which public administration often 
addresses the question.  The discipline is wedded to an analytic distinction between 
market, hierarchy, and network and treats that distinction as if it were an empirically 
observable phenomenon. 
 
If it is correct that hybrid forms are the norm, how can this be explained?  This takes 
us to the role of institutional entrepreneurs, actors who utilise moments where change 
is possible to bring into play new sets of norms, rules, practices and potentially 
organizational forms.  Hajer (2003) presents these moments as institutional voids, 
where “there are no clear rules and norms according to which politics is to be 
conducted and policy measures are to be agreed upon” (2003, 175).  Institutional 
voids appear more commonly as society increases in complexity and diversity, and 
old structures fragment, offering multiple points where agency can be exercised.  For 
Crouch (2005), the key actors in this process are institutional entrepreneurs who “will 
not be content with the overall structure of governance institutions they find around 
them, but will try to borrow and adapt components from a variety of them in a kind of 
institutional bricolage to produce new combinations that bring together apparently 
incompatible functions” (2005: 154).  Such actors can include public administrators 
operating across organizational boundaries to build new institutions (Box 2001; 
Feldman and Khamedian 2007), and civic activists such as the every-day makers 
described by Bang and Sørensen (2001).  The process is one of recombinant 
governance – in other words, hybridization – in which actors utilise those elements of 
different governance mode that offer the best prospect of achieving desired outcomes 
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(Crouch 2005).  Legitimacy for such hybrid forms comes from the legacies that are 
brought into play, a process of “remembering” (realising the potential of forgotten 
institutional alternatives) “borrowing” (the transfer of institutional resources from 
adjacent arenas) and “sharing” (extending existing forms within the same action 
space) (Lowndes 2005).   
 
 
HYBRIDITY AS A CULTURAL PROCESS 
 
Notions of recombinant governance and bricolage – which in its French usage means 
assembly from available parts, do-it-yourself, or creating something new from 
whatever is to hand - lead inevitably to a consideration of cultural theory.  This is a 
field with which public administration scholars have made little connection but which 
offers considerable potential for rethinking and reimagining the fundamental 
problems of policy and practice with which we are concerned.  Cultural theory has a 
number of distinct schools, and it is Mary Douglas’s work on grid-group theory that 
has been most utilised in public administration scholarship.  But it is another strand, 
that deriving from cultural studies, that is explored here.  This branch of cultural 
theory sets out to challenge ideas that espouse an essentialist and unproblematic view 
of the world (for example: globalization, nationalism, community) and which are 
rooted in a singular causation (which, in the above cases, would be: neo-liberalism, 
ethnic purity, common interest) (Brah and Coombes 2000).  It does this by proposing 
a more diverse, complex, and socially constructed world in which analysis should be 
focused on the way in which identities are produced and change, how the boundaries 
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between identities are constructed and understood, and how these affect the way in 
which the claims of different groups are valued and negotiated.   
 
Within such cultural theory, hybridization expresses three ideas of relevance to our 
discussion (Bhabha 1994).  First, that essentialist propositions conceal a more 
complex reality.  For example, colonialism’s claim to white European superiority is 
made despite evidence of considerable merging of white and indigenous cultures and 
populations.  Second, new possibilities may be created at those points where there is 
an articulation of cultural difference.   So, in the case of colonization, the mixing of 
ethnicities, nations and cultures itself created hybrids - new identities forged across 
and in opposition to apparently clearly defined and impermeable boundaries (Berger 
and Huntington 2002).  More contemporaneously, the creative possibilities of 
hybridity are vividly demonstrated in the artistic sphere where, as a result of the 
Internet’s global reach, styles of music, dress, and language constantly interact, 
combine and recombine into new identities.  Third, and unlike TCE, management and 
archetype theories, the form hybridity takes is not directly traceable back to the 
components of the cultures from which it arises.  Instead, it emerges in a new creative 
space in which there is ambivalence, ambiguity, and indeterminacy, and in which 
there is a struggle for recognition or social validation (Nederveen Pieterse 2009). 
 
When translated into a public administration context, this theory counteracts the idea 
of uniformity of policy design by recognising that local resistance is a positive force 
for the negotiation of contextually appropriate settlements in a plural and diverse 
society.  Hybridity, then, arises from the agency of actors creatively resisting the 
imposition of a singular, unmediated approach.  So rather than incorporate the 
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community into policing policies, educational provision, or forms of community 
empowerment pre-determined by government, an awareness of cultural theory enables 
public administrators to understand resistance, contestation and argument as a natural 
part of a process in which such policy designs can grow out from such interaction 
between the various parties, and as a result be generative of a new possibility that may 
not previously have been imagined.  This cultural conception of hybridity offers a 
perspective that boundaries are malleable and capable of being transgressed, despite 
pressures for uniformity and rigidity.  This is somewhat different to the theories 
discussed earlier, locating the concept of hybridity in the context of a political 
struggle over questions of identity, boundaries, and legitimacy.  It takes us away from 
economic and organizational theory, and towards questions of governmentality.   
 
For Nederveen Pieterse, this understanding of hybridity opens up the possibilities for 
a radical critique of institutional arrangements.  Returning to an earlier theme, he 
argues: “… the real problem is not hybridity – which is common throughout history – 
but boundaries and the social proclivity to boundary fetishism.  Hybridity is 
unremarkable and is noteworthy only from the point of view of boundaries that have 
been essentialized…. The importance of hybridity is that it problematizes boundaries” 
(2001, 220).  Pieterse’s observation is particularly pertinent to public administration, 
with its primary orientation to rule-bound behaviour and distinctions between roles of 
administrators, elected officials and citizens, and to defining which citizens are and 
are not to be included in participation initiatives.  It suggests that these principles of 
public administration, based in nineteenth century Progressive Era reforms, constrain 
governmental actors’ capacity to develop imaginative approaches for the more 
complex twenty first century environment, especially in a knowledge rich world 
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where the certainties of professional and administrative expertise are open to 
challenge in new ways.  This is an issue that Pieterse does not explicitly follow 
through.  For the boundaries that he discusses rest on a knowledge regime in which 
rational scientific knowledge (a mainstay of public administration practice) is 
privileged over local knowledge created at the peripheries of existing structures, yet 
which by virtue of its contextually-specific and often experiential and subjective 
character is less amenable to codification and summation by managers and 
professionals (Yanow 2003).  Hybridity as a transgression of institutional boundaries 
is thus also intimately connected with hybridity as the construction of a knowledge 
regime in which every-day, personal and experiential data is valued as much as that 
collected through quantitative surveys. 
 
How might this perspective be utilised in the public administration context?  It offers 
a more actor and action-centred view of governance than is typically found in the 
public administration literature.  The field has a strong orientation to structural 
analysis and prescription, and downplays questions of agency.  The cultural theory of 
hybridity suggests that structures are contingent on the agency generated through 
countless day-to-day practices in a specific context.  In other words, hybridity 
expresses a process of contestation and argumentation when “local” actors meet 
“wider” forces.  This might take the form of resistance or adaptation to these external 
pressures, in a way that is dynamic and evolving.  Thus, the points at which civil 
society organizations and citizens are brought into contact with government and 
business in contracting-out, governance networks, or collaborative management 
become an important focus for investigation because it is here that national and global 
forces intersect with local identities and cultures of governance.  The difficulties 
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politicians and public administrators report in engaging with citizens (for example, 
because citizens fail to appreciate the rules of the game in participation exercises) are 
precisely indicative of a struggle over the colonization of local practices by 
externally-mandated and essentialist models of governance.  Cultural theory points to 
a need to recognise difference and the way in which the meanings of boundaries are 
constructed in order for those boundaries to be transgressed.  As public administration 
works more frequently with and through communities, citizens, not for profits and 
business, so consciousness of these issues is essential if these positions are to be 
hybridized to create new possibilities for progressive public policy.   
 
The cultural theory of hybridity has immediate implications for the analysis of 
settings in which definitions of boundaries are central to the authority and legitimation 
of claims.  Studies of citizen participation show that politicians and public 
administrators mediate the claims of citizens with reference to judgements about their 
position relative to accepted boundaries, for example in relation to norms of 
engagement covering mode of address, emotionality of expression, reasonableness of 
demands, and so on (Barnes, Newman, Knops and Sullivan 2003).  This reflects a 
wider problem, demonstrated most vividly in the environmental field, in which 
scientific knowledge offers possibilities and potentialities, while social and cultural 
knowledge identifies problems and constraints (Eden and Tunstall 2006; Leach 2006).  
Hybridity, therefore, can be understood as a process of “becoming” that takes place in 
a site of contestation – a space of institutional transition in which meaning, identity 
and rules are negotiated and renegotiated and as a result enable the emergence of new 
possibilities for public administration.  The point is developed by Fischer (2006) who 
argues for attention to be devoted to the microcultural politics of social space – in 
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other words, the analysis of intersubjective aspects of political spaces beyond the 
established structures of the state and of the institutions of governance that emerge in 
them.  He connects with the cultural theory of hybridity when he states that “political 
space, from this perspective, is not just filled up with competing interests but rather is 
understood as something that is created, opened, and shaped by social 
understandings” (2006, 25).   
 
 
BRINGING HYBRIDITY INTO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 
SCHOLARSHIP AND PRACTICE 
 
Cultural theory offers a productive solution to the paradox of hybridity.  It takes an 
empirically problematic and theoretically rootless concept and grounds it in an 
explanatory theory that also offers the promise of developing normative policy design.  
It provides an important opportunity for public administration scholars to develop 
new understandings of the processes of governance and administrative transitions, and 
is an antidote to the essentialist prescriptions that have predominated through the 
recent decades of new public management dominance.  In particular, it draws our 
attention to the importance of plural understandings of identities and boundaries, 
contrasting with the somewhat simplified distinctions that predominate in our field – 
for example: market-hierarchy-network; politician-administrator-citizen; and 
references to “the public” as a generic group.  The understanding of “local” identities 
is essential because even the most democratically progressive prescriptions, for 
example on user and citizen participation, often arrive ready formed from a 




The cultural perspective on hybridity requires an analytical strategy that builds on the 
traditions of interpretive research into local knowledge.  This is essential in order to 
reframe analysis away from the concerns of state actors and towards the governmental 
norms and identities of local actors in their specific context.  Such a refocusing does 
not to ignore the demands of politicians and public administrators for research-based 
advice on how to proceed, but aims to provide such advice by modelling strategies 
they might use in order to better engage with hybridity as a normal part of everyday 
practice, rather than to see it as a problem to be overcome.     
 
The analytical strategy proposed here has a number of basic principles.  It places 
emphasis on meaning making by actors; that is, the sense that individual and 
collective actors make of an institutional transformation.   Thus, analysis should 
reveal the object of contestation.   This is at the heart of the analysis of hybridity, 
since it is here that citizens, technical experts, politicians, public administrators, 
business leaders, and others interact – each drawing on their own forms of knowledge 
and authority.  Points of contestation will be subject to argument between actors.  
Analysis, therefore, should investigate the argumentation strategies that are deployed 
by actors – claim making, the propositions that are adduced, the knowledge that is 
utilised, and so on – and the way this impacts on the generation and legitimation of 
knowledge in relation to the policies and practices of public administration.  Analysis 
of argumentation positions should seek to establish what meta-arguments or higher 
level discourses hold the actors together.  In other words, what enables the 
conversation to continue despite the differences between actors?  Here there is an 
important place for the study of agreement and ambiguity.  Drawing from the study of 
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argumentation, for example in international relations and diplomacy as well as in 
citizen-government forums, analysis should consider the process through which 
agreements-to-agree and agreements-to-disagree are reached, as well as the way in 
which open political discussion can develop new understanding and greater tolerance 
of diversity (Pattie and Johnston 2008; Risse 2000).  It also helps us understand the 
role of ambiguity in enabling actors to maintain a relationship despite the differences 
between them. 
 
This analytical strategy overcomes current limitations in our field, including the 
difficulty of delimiting hybrids in terms of governance or organizational boundaries 
and the problem of giving this concept empirical purchase.  Moving the unit of 
analysis away from organizations and forms of governance and towards cultures and 
arguments enables us to develop a theoretical position that offers useful possibilities 
for the public administration community.  Mapping the terrain of argumentation will 
help us to overcome the current tendency to assume that an individual’s position in 
relation to a policy debate is defined by organizational or sector membership.  The 
emphasis on argumentation also enables us to consider hybridity as a moment of 
partial settlement, reflecting more accurately the empirical conditions of flux and 
transformation found in contemporary Western societies and governmental systems.  
Analysing the negotiation of different knowledge claims across these cultural 
boundaries provides an important task for the researcher, both theoretically in terms 
of explaining the incidence and form of hybridity but also normatively in identifying 
the conditions under which dialogue can be maintained despite the differences 
between actors.  The communicative ontology that underpins the case for a cultural 
analysis of hybridity gives primacy to the articulation of and contestation over 
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meanings as the medium through which politics takes place, and thus through which 
actors are enabled or constrained to exercise agency in hybridizing new possibilities.  
In conclusion, the cultural theory of hybridity offers a constructive project to guide 
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